All of the following Statements about China`s Great Leap Forward Policy Are True except
A 2017 paper by two Peking University economists found "strong evidence that unrealistic yield targets from 1959 to 1961 led to an excessive number of deaths, and further analysis shows that yield targets caused inflation in cereal production and excessive purchases. We also note that decades after Mao`s death, Mao`s radical policies led to a serious deterioration in the accumulation of human capital and a slowdown in economic development in the regions affected by this policy. [128] A dramatic decline in cereal production continued for several years, resulting in a decline in production of more than 25% in 1960-61. The reasons for this decline can be found both in natural disasters and in government policy. [46] Houser, Sands, and Xiao conclude in their 2005 research study using "provincial-level demographic panel data and a Bayesian empirical approach to distinguish the relative importance of weather and national politics in China`s great demographic catastrophe" that "China suffered a total of about 14.8 million additional deaths from 1959 to 1961. Of these, about 69 per cent (or 10.3 million) appear to be due to the effects of national policies. [57]: 156 This policy was gradually imposed between 1949 and 1958 in response to immediate political needs, first by the establishment of "mutual assistance teams" of 5 to 15 households, then in 1953 "elementary agricultural cooperatives" of 20 to 40 households, then from 1956 in "higher cooperatives" of 100 to 300 families. Beginning in 1954, farmers were encouraged to form and join collective agricultural associations that would supposedly increase their efficiency without stealing their own land or restricting their livelihoods. [9] The true extent of the famine was only revealed to the world with the publication of age distributions in 1982 from the country`s first highly reliable census. This data made it possible to estimate the total number of excessive deaths between 1959 and 1961, and the first calculations of American demographers estimated the number of deaths at 16.5 to 23 million.9 Subsequent more detailed studies revealed 23 to 30 million additional deaths, and unpublished Chinese documents suggest sums closer to 40 million.10-12 We will never know the true number, since the official Chinese figures for the three years of hunger greatly underestimate both the decline in fertility and the increase in mortality, and because we cannot accurately reconstruct these vital statistics (Fig. 2).2). Mao resigned as head of state of the People`s Republic of China on April 27, 1959, but remained chairman of the CCP. Liu Shaoqi (the new president of the PRC) and reformist Deng Xiaoping (general secretary of the CPC) were tasked with changing policies to ensure economic recovery.
Mao`s Great Leap Forward policy was openly criticized at the party congress in Lushan. The criticism was led by Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, who was initially alarmed by the potentially negative impact of the Great Leap on the modernization of the armed forces and urged even anonymous party members to "jump into communism in one step." After the Lushan confrontation, Mao replaced Peng with Lin Biao. In 1958-1960, despite widespread famine in the countryside, China continued to be a major net exporter of grain as Mao tried to save face and convince the outside world of the success of his plans. Foreign aid was refused. When Japan`s foreign minister spoke to his Chinese counterpart Chen Yi about an offer of 100,000 tons of wheat to be shipped to the public, it was rejected. John F. Kennedy was also aware that the Chinese exported food to Africa and Cuba during the famine, and he said, "We had no indication from the Chinese Communists that they would welcome any food supply." [40] [unreliable source?] The impact on the upper levels of government in response to the disaster was complex when Mao purged National Defense Minister Peng Dehuai in 1959, temporarily promoted Lin Biao, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, and Mao lost some power and prestige after the Great Leap Forward that led him to the Cultural Revolution in 1966. China`s relations with the Soviet Union had become increasingly strained, and Mao was concerned about what Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev`s condemnation of Stalin in 1956 and Khrushchev`s impeachment in 1964 meant to him as China`s leader. .